In this report, the two alternative scenarios being considered by EERE and FE staff -carbon capand-trade and high fuel prices -are compared to other scenarios used by energy analysts and utility planners. The report also briefly evaluates the past accuracy of fossil fuel price forecasts.
We find that the natural gas prices through 2025 proposed in the FE-EERE Scenarios Working Group's High Fuel Price Scenario appear to be reasonable based on current natural gas prices and other externally generated gas price forecasts and scenarios. If anything, an even more extreme gas price scenario might be considered. The price escalation from 2025 to 2050 within the proposed High Fuel Price Scenario is harder to evaluate, primarily because few existing forecasts or scenarios extend beyond 2025, but, at first blush, it also appears reasonable.
Similarly, we find that the oil prices originally proposed by the Working Group in the High Fuel Price Scenario appear to be reasonable, if not conservative, based on: (1) the current forward market for oil, (2) current oil prices, (3) externally generated oil price forecasts, and (4) the historical difficulty in accurately forecasting oil prices. Overall, a spread between the FE-EERE High Oil Price and Reference scenarios of well over $8/bbl is supported by the literature.
We conclude that a wide range of carbon regulation scenarios are possible, especially within the time frame considered by EERE and FE (through 2050) . The Working Group's Carbon Cap-&-Trade Scenario is found to be less aggressive than many Kyoto-style targets that have been analyzed, and similar in magnitude to the proposed Climate Stewardship Act. The proposed scenario is more aggressive than some other scenarios found in the literature, however, and ignores carbon banking and offsets and does not allow nuclear power to expand. We are therefore somewhat concerned that the stringency of the proposed carbon regulation scenario in the 2010 to 2025 period will lead to a particularly high estimated cost of carbon reduction. As described in more detail later, we encourage some flexibility in the Working Group's ultimate implementation of the Carbon Cap-and-Trade Scenario. We conclude by identifying additional scenarios that might be considered in future analyses, describing a concern with the proposed specification of the High Fuel Price Scenario, and highlighting the possible difficulty of implementing extreme scenarios with current energy modeling tools.
Introduction
The benefits of the Department of Energy's research and development (R&D) efforts have historically been estimated only under business-as-usual market and policy conditions. In recognition of the insurance, or options, value of R&D efforts, however, the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) and the Office of Fossil Energy (FE) have been jointly exploring options for evaluating the benefits of their R&D efforts under an array of alternative futures. Specifically, alternative scenarios will be used to evaluate R&D efforts under different market conditions, where the benefits of R&D within each scenario will be measured as the difference between a baseline (no R&D program) case and a program (R&D) case. 1 As part of that effort, on July 30, 2004, the FE-EERE Scenarios Working Group (the Working Group) proposed to EERE and FE Staff the application of an initial set of three scenarios for use in the Working Group's upcoming analyses. The Working Group's immediate goal is to use those scenarios to conduct a pilot analysis of the benefits of EERE and FE R&D efforts. Eventually it is hoped that routine analyses can be conducted under a broad range of possible future market conditions, and a more comprehensive evaluation of R&D benefits derived.
The Working Group proposed three specific scenarios:
• Reference Case Scenario • Carbon Cap-and-Trade Scenario • High Fuel Price Scenario, which includes heightened natural gas and oil prices The two alternative scenarios described by the Working Group, the Carbon Cap-and-Trade Scenario and the High Fuel Price Scenario, would ideally be benchmarked against (i.e., compared to) other scenarios commonly used among energy analysts. Such benchmarking would help to support whatever scenarios are ultimately chosen by FE and EERE management, and to assess how aggressive FE-EERE scenarios might be while still maintaining credibility. This paper begins that benchmarking exercise. Specifically, we compile information on scenarios used in other analyses, focusing on natural gas price, oil price, and carbon regulation scenarios. While we have not sought to be exhaustive in our review, we do summarize a reasonably wide range of sources.
The following criteria have been used to loosely judge whether to include a particular study:
• Are the scenarios directly relevant and comparable to the proposed FE-EERE scenarios?
• Are the scenarios appropriately geographically focused?
• Are the scenarios sufficiently long-term?
• Are the scenarios from credible third-party "citable" sources?
• Are the scenarios sufficiently recent to be of maximum value?
We also briefly look at the past forecast accuracy of Energy Information Administration's (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) projections for natural gas and oil prices, as we believe this also provides useful information on the plausible range of scenarios for these two variables. We note that a literature assessing energy model forecast accuracy has developed, much of which notes that energy models typically underestimate (or worse, ignore) uncertainties.
2 This is also a key finding from an earlier study commissioned by EERE.
Natural Gas Price Scenarios
Among actively traded commodities, natural gas ranks as one of the most volatile-priced. 4 Future natural gas prices are also highly uncertain, and multiple price path scenarios are possible. In its memorandum dated July 30, 2004 In this section we benchmark the natural gas prices contained in the proposed High Fuel Price Scenario against other such scenarios that have recently been externally developed.
5 Where possible, we report not only the absolute price level of each scenario, but also the degree to which any high gas price scenario exceeds the corresponding "base-case" scenario, comparing that differential to the gap between the Working Group's proposed High Fuel Price and Reference Case scenarios. This differential is relevant because the various studies cited have been conducted at different times and under different market conditions, 6 and partly as a result, not all base-case scenarios project similar levels of future gas prices. On the other hand, it deserves note that high gas price scenarios do not have a uniform meaning across the studies reviewed here, i.e., they are not systematically defined in a rigorous way to represent a certain point on the plausible price distribution. Therefore, one should not place undue emphasis on the differential between the high-and base-case scenarios.
Reference Case Comparisons
We begin by comparing the Working Group's Reference Case Scenario to other non-EIA reference case scenarios, drawing on the EIA's own forecast comparisons contained in each Annual Energy Outlook. Results from AEO 2004 shown in Figure 1 suggest that the AEO 2004 Reference case is higher than most other non-EIA reference cases, and therefore that the proposed High Fuel Price Scenario would appear even more aggressive against the alternative reference cases shown. Because Figure 1 is focused solely on reference cases, however, it provides limited information on alternatives to "base-case" scenarios. 
EIA High Gas Price Scenarios
In addition to generating its own Reference case (which, as noted earlier, is also the Working Group's proposed Reference Case Scenario), the EIA routinely develops high natural gas price scenarios. For example, in AEO 2004 there are three scenarios that typically produce higher natural gas prices than the EIA's Reference case -the High Oil Price case, the High Economic Growth case, and the Slow Oil & Gas Technological Progress case. Figure 2 shows that wellhead gas prices in the EIA's Slow Oil & Gas Technological Progress case are $0.69/Mcf above the EIA's Reference case in 2025.
In February 2004 the EIA released a report titled Analysis of Restricted Natural Gas Supply Cases, in which it examined, both individually and combined, scenarios involving no Alaskan gas pipeline, low LNG imports, and low unconventional gas recovery relative to the AEO 2004 Reference case. The Combined Low Supply case is shown in Figure 2 . Wellhead prices are projected to be $1.21/Mcf higher than the EIA Reference case in 2025, and consistent in absolute magnitude (at ~$5.5/Mcf ) with the price level proposed for 2025 by the Working Group. 8 Additional older EIA publications have also generated high gas price forecasts, but given the existence of more recent projections (see Figure 2 ) and the run-up in gas prices in recent years, we have decided not to include these older, outdated forecasts. It should also be noted that the EIA's high and low gas price cases are not attempts to bound the limits of uncertainty. Instead, they merely represent plausible alternative scenarios designed to provide some insight into the reaction of energy markets to higher fuel prices. 
Other High Gas Price Scenarios
A number of private-sector forecasting services generate proprietary high gas price scenarios that are available only for a fee; we did not seek to obtain such forecasts. We were, however, able to find and review a number of non-EIA gas price forecasts and scenarios that are in the public domain.
In the fall of 2003, at the request of Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham, the National Petroleum Council (NPC) released a landmark study examining the domestic natural gas market. The study modeled two broad scenarios, titled the Reactive Path and the Balanced Future scenarios. Figure 3 shows the range of potential gas prices projected in the NPC study by modeling runs from Energy and Environmental Analysis (EEA). In 2025, the upper bound wellhead price (representing extremes of the Reactive Path scenario, at over $6.5/Mcf) is well above that proposed by the Working Group, and is roughly $1.9/Mcf above the mid-point of the full range of projected prices. Hanson et al.
12 project a variety of energy futures for the United States using scenario analysis and the AMIGA model developed by Argonne National Laboratory. Four alternative, integrated scenarios are developed: the official future, cheap energy reigns supreme, big problems ahead, and technology drives the market. The official future and big problems ahead scenarios effectively represent reference case and high fossil price scenarios, respectively, but in both cases these are integrated scenarios developed by altering numerous input assumptions, not just fuel price inputs. In addition, the big problems ahead scenario is intended to represent a chaotic, event-driven scenario as opposed to a "smooth" scenario typical of most energy models. Unlike the other scenarios presented in this paper, the Hanson et al. scenarios extend until 2050. The average wellhead natural gas prices in the two scenarios are presented below. Differences in gas prices between the two scenarios range from $0.57/Mcf to $1.32/Mcf. 
Scenarios from Utility Integrated Resource Plans
We also examined several recent utility integrated resource plans (IRPs). Idaho Power's 2004 IRP includes three gas price scenarios. As shown in Figure 7 , the wellhead price in the High gas price scenario is $1.43/Mcf above the Expected gas price scenario in 2025 (at $5.2/Mcf), and Idaho Power gave this high price scenario a 30% probability of occurrence. Avista Utilities uses Monte Carlo simulation rather than scenarios to account for uncertainty in future gas prices. To reflect the lognormal distribution of gas prices (i.e., capped on the downside at $0, while potentially unlimited on the upside), Avista's 2003 IRP assumes that natural gas prices have an asymmetrical distribution. Gas prices are also inversely correlated with hydroelectric generation -as hydropower falls, gas prices increase. Figure 8 are presumably nominal, and for delivery of gas to a Northwest trading hub, though this is not clearly stated in the IRP). Note that towards the end of the forecast period the 80% confidence interval -whose bounds could reasonably be considered a high and low gas price scenario -is roughly $3/MCf wide (i.e., ~$1.5/Mcf above and below the average price). In addition, Avista analyzed several additional scenarios, including a high gas price scenario of twice the average price listed in Figure IRP's from other utilities that we reviewed provided little additional information of relevance.
13 13 For example, in an update to its 2003 IRP, Puget Sound Energy (PSE) averages four gas price forecasts -two from Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA), one from Petroleum Industry Research Associates (PIRA), and the NWPPC's Medium scenario shown above. The IRP provides graphs, but not tables, of these gas price projections in nominal dollars for Northwestern trading hubs. Given the difficulty in deciphering and translating the data behind these graphs into a form that would enable comparison within this report, we instead simply note here that PSE adopted as its "extreme" (high) gas price scenario NWPPC's Medium gas price forecast, which is shown in Figure 5 above. The average natural gas price forecast contained in Portland General Electric's 2004 IRP Final Action Plan was also constructed using natural gas bid prices and the NWPPC forecast. Monte Carlo analysis was conducted around these values. PGE's high price forecast simply matched the AEO 2004 reference case assumptions. PacifiCorp performed Monte Carlo analysis of projected natural gas prices, with parameters derived
Past EIA Forecast Accuracy
Finally, we look at the past accuracy of EIA Reference case natural gas price projections, going back to Annual Energy Outlook 1985. Figure 9 illustrates that EIA Reference case gas price projections have historically been trend-following, lagging behind movements in spot market prices (note that this graph is in nominal $/Mcf, whereas others presented in this section have been normalized to 2002 $/Mcf where possible). As such, the EIA over-forecast gas prices throughout much of the 1980's and 1990's (when actual gas prices fell and remained relatively low and steady), and more recently appears to have under-forecast gas prices (as actual gas prices have risen). The dark hatched line represents the current (i.e., from August 11, 2004) 6-year forward price curve from the NYMEX futures market (adjusted to wellhead-equivalent and $/Mcf per footnote 5). Note that this forward curve is well above Reference case forecasts from recent AEO's, and is arguably a better projection of spot gas prices over the short-to intermediate-term than the EIA Reference case forecast (assuming that the forward curve reflects the market's expectation of future prices).
14 Overall, this picture of past forecast accuracy and variability should give pause to those who believe that gas price forecasts have narrow uncertainty bounds. First, expectations of future gas prices have clearly varied substantially over time. With such wide variations in expected future gas prices over time, very wide uncertainty bounds on future gas prices are warranted. Second, as is clear from Figure 9 , the historic accuracy of long-term gas price forecasts is poor. Forecasts from the 1980's clearly overestimated future gas prices by wide margins, while forecasts from the late 1990's to the present appear to have underestimated prices. If we apply the error seen in past forecasts to current forecasts, sizable uncertainty bounds of at least plus-or-minus $2/Mcf appear to have merit.
from historic data and econometric analysis. Average prices were established based on PacifiCorp's internal forward curve and PIRA's March 2002 long-term forecast. 14 It bears mention here that the EIA's Reference case forecasts are intended to serve as baselines for policy analysis, and are not intended to capture the impact of a variety of events that can cause price volatility in markets. Indeed, all EIA Reference case forecasts assume no change in current policy over the forecast period -an assumption that is bound to render such forecasts inaccurate. Nonetheless, Figure 9 (and Figure 14 later) paints a clear picture of the tremendous uncertainty that exists in forecasts of natural gas (and oil) prices. 
Summary
In conclusion, the natural gas prices through 2025 proposed in the FE-EERE Scenarios Working Group's High Fuel Price Scenario appear to be reasonable based on current natural gas prices and other externally generated gas price forecasts and scenarios. If anything, an even more extreme gas price scenario could be considered. 
Oil Price Scenarios
Like natural gas prices, future oil prices are also highly uncertain, and have proven difficult to predict, especially given that both economic influences and OPEC behavior are in play. In this section, we benchmark the reasonableness of the oil prices contained in the initially proposed High Fuel Price Scenario against other published scenarios. Where possible, we report not only the absolute price level of each scenario, but also the degree to which any high oil price scenario exceeds the corresponding "base-case" scenario, comparing that differential to the gap between the Working Group's proposed High Fuel Price and Reference Case scenarios.
Reference Case Comparisons
We begin by comparing the AEO 2004 Reference case to other non-EIA reference cases, drawing on the EIA's own forecast comparisons contained in each Annual Energy Outlook.
Results from AEO 2004 shown in Figure 10 suggest that the AEO 2004 Reference case is higher than most other non-EIA reference cases, and therefore that the Working Group's proposed High Fuel Price Scenario would appear even more aggressive against the alternative reference cases shown. 15 Because Figure 10 is focused solely on reference cases, however, it does little to inform us of alternatives to "base-case" scenarios. (2003) GII (2003) IEA (2002) PEL (2003) PIRA (2003) NRCan (2002) DB (2003) EEA (2003) NPC (2003) SEER (2003) CGES (2003) 
Other High Oil Price Scenarios
A number of private-sector forecasting services generate proprietary high oil price scenarios that are available only for a fee; we did not seek to obtain such forecasts. We were, however, able to find and review a number of non-EIA oil price forecasts and scenarios that are in the public domain.
In April 2003, the Northwest Power Planning Council (NWPPC) generated oil price forecasts as inputs to it Fifth Power Plan. As shown in Figure 12 , the High oil price scenario is $8.18/bbl above the Medium scenario in 2025. This differential, as well as the absolute level of prices contained in the High scenario, are quite similar to those shown above from AEO 2004. (2004) project a variety of energy futures for the United States using scenario analysis and the AMIGA model developed by Argonne National Laboratory. Two of these scenarios, the official future and big problems ahead scenarios, effectively represent reference case and high fossil price scenarios. The big problems ahead scenario is specifically intended to represent a chaotic, event-driven world. The average world oil price in the two scenarios is presented below in Table 2 . Differences in world oil prices between the two scenarios range widely, from $36/bbl in 2010 and $23/bbl in 2020, to $14/bbl by 2050. A 1997 Delphi survey of experts in the oil industry conducted by the California Energy Commission generated low, most likely, and high oil price forecasts out to 2018. 17 In 2018, prices were expected to be $18/bbl, $26/bbl, and $43/bbl respectively (all in 2002 dollars). Thus, the differential between the high and most likely scenarios was about $17/bbl in 2018. Although this survey is dated, we include its results here as an alternative to forecasts generated by constrained energy models. It is specifically worth noting that the experts in the Delphi survey apparently view future oil prices as more uncertain than seen in most energy models, i.e., the difference between the high and most likely scenarios in the Delphi survey are greater than shown by the energy models presented earlier.
Past EIA Forecast Accuracy
Finally, we look at the past accuracy of EIA reference case oil price projections, going back to Annual Energy Outlook 1985. Figure 14 illustrates that EIA reference case oil price projections have historically been trend-following, lagging behind movements in spot market prices (note that this graph is in nominal $/bbl, whereas others presented in this section have been normalized to 2002 $/bbl where possible). As such, the EIA over-forecast oil prices throughout much of the 1980's and 1990's (when actual oil prices fell and remained relatively low and steady), and more recently appears to have under-forecast oil prices (as actual oil prices have risen, and currently hover around $45-50/bbl). The dark hatched line represents the current (i.e., from August 11, 2004) 6-year forward price curve from the NYMEX futures market. Note that this forward curve is well above reference case forecasts from recent AEO's, and is arguably a better projection of spot oil prices over the short-to intermediate-term than the AEO's Reference case forecast (assuming that the forward curve reflects the market's expectation of future prices).
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As with the natural gas results presented earlier, this picture of past forecast accuracy and variability should give pause to those who believe that oil price forecasts have narrow uncertainty bounds. 
Summary
In conclusion, the oil prices originally proposed by the FE-EERE Working Group in the High Fuel Price Scenario (assuming AEO 04) appear to be reasonable, if not too low, based on: (1) the forward market for oil, which predicts prices to average in the $35-40/bbl range for 6 years, (2) current prices which, while representing a peak and not an annual average, at $45-50/bbl have already reached the projected price based on the AEO 2004 High Oil Price case in 2050, 18 Again, we acknowledge that EIA Reference case forecasts are not intended to capture the impact of a variety of events that can cause price volatility in markets. We also note that NYMEX oil futures prices, which are deliverable to Cushing, Oklahoma, are not directly comparable to the world oil prices used by the EIA, which reflect average refiner acquisition costs for imported crude oil. Thus, the comparison between the NYMEX futures prices and world oil prices in Figure 14 should be considered to be illustrative only. In fact, with oil prices currently hovering around $45-50/bbl and many geologists predicting the end of "cheap" oil as they expect production from economically recoverable reserves to peak in the near future, one could potentially argue that adopting the prices contained in the EIA's AEO 04 High Oil Price case may not be extreme enough for the purpose at hand. It is expected, however, that the AEO 2005 High Oil Price case will be more aggressive, and may not be subject to the same degree of criticism. Overall, a spread between the oil prices in the FE-EERE High Fuel Price and Reference Case Scenarios of well over $8/bbl is supported by the literature.
In fact, based on recent FE and EERE staff guidance, the Working Group has been exploring a more aggressive oil price scenario than originally envisioned.
Carbon Regulation Scenarios
The development of domestic carbon regulation in the 2005-2050 timeframe is possible, if not likely, though the actual design, timing, and magnitude of those regulations are uncertain.
Several bills that would regulate carbon emissions are currently pending before the U.S. Congress, most notably the Climate Stewardship Act (S. 139, McCain-Lieberman). 19 While the U.S. does not plan to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, ratification by a sufficient number of other countries may result in Kyoto coming into force. 20 Finally, even if one believes that national carbon regulation in the U.S. is unlikely, state-level action has already begun and many expect state-level action to intensify. As such, in the 2005-2050 timeframe, some level of carbon regulation is a near certainty (at least in a subset of U.S. states).
The FE-EERE Scenarios Working Group has proposed a Carbon Cap-&-Trade
Scenario that involves a simple carbon cap for all energy sectors. Under the scenario, U.S. carbon emissions are to be reduced from the baseline by approximately 500 million metric tons of elemental carbon equivalent (mmtce) by 2017. Carbon reductions are assumed to begin in 2010. After 2017, the cap is held constant through 2050, which is equivalent to stabilizing U.S. carbon emissions at about 1996 levels (1470 mmtce). Because of the complexity involved in modeling such a scenario, the Working Group further proposed that carbon banking not be considered, that nuclear capacity be held constant, that no international offsets be employed, and that actual regulatory details be ignored. 
EIA Carbon Policy Scenarios
EIA has itself analyzed several sets of proposed carbon regulations:
Kyoto: In October 1998, EIA published The Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy Markets and Economic Activity. The study analyzed the commitment of the United States under Kyoto to limit carbon emissions to 7% below 1990 levels in the 2008-2012 timeframe (on an average basis). Because the specific rules under Kyoto had not yet been established, the EIA study evaluated multiple carbon reduction scenarios, as shown in Figure 15 . In each case, the analysis assumed that the target would remain constant from 2013 to 2020 (the end of the forecast period), and the targets were assumed to have a three year phase in period, beginning in 2005. EIA's analysis of the cost of these carbon reduction scenarios shows a wide range of results, from $67 per metric ton of carbon equivalent (mtce) to $348 per metric ton (1996$) depending on the stringency of the carbon cap. EIA performed sensitivity cases based on variations in economic growth, technology improvement, and nuclear additions. EIA also compared their results to those of other comparable analyses, finding that the EIA's analysis projects a higher cost of carbon reduction than the other models analyzed. EIA's 1990-7% results assume that international trading and sinks are not allowed; all carbon reductions must occur domestically in the energy sector. The other cases evaluated by EIA were intended to reflect a plausible range of costs under alternative scenarios that might involve greater flexibility in achieving the Kyoto targets (including the use of sinks and international trade in carbon credits). The Working Group's proposed Carbon Cap-&-Trade Scenario, with an approximate 500 mmtce reduction of energy-sector carbon emissions by 2017, is less stringent than one of the Kyoto scenarios analyzed by EIA, but is more aggressive than the others (shown in Figure 15 ). Unlike the FE-EERE Working Group's proposed scenario, however, the McCain-Lieberman bill allows banking of carbon allowances as well as the use of a variety of offset allowances. As such, implementation of the Working Group's proposed scenario may result in higher compliance costs and market disruption than the EIA's analysis of the Climate Stewardship Act. On the other hand, the Climate Stewardship Act exempts certain sectors from the carbon regulation, whereas the Working Group has proposed no such restrictions. Finally, it deserves note that EIA has conducted substantial sensitivity analysis on their S.139 results, including a high technology case, a no new nuclear/no sequestration case, a high natural gas price case, a no banking case, a commercial coverage case, varied auction cases, and two different offset cases. 
Other Domestic Carbon Reduction Scenarios
More generally, one can benchmark the proposed FE-EERE Scenarios Working Group proposed Carbon Cap-&-Trade Scenario to other domestic scenarios for carbon reduction, and the cost of achieving that reduction.
• President Bush's GHG intensity proposal. In February 2002, President Bush unveiled a proposal to reduce the greenhouse gas (GHG) intensity of the US economy by 18% over ten years (i.e., by 2012 
International Comparisons
One can also benchmark the FE-EERE Scenarios Working Group proposed Carbon Cap-&-Trade Scenario with other scenarios of international carbon emissions. For example, in its 2000 Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, the IPCC -using six integrated assessment models common to the literature -developed a set of scenarios to represent the range of driving forces and emissions in the scenario literature. This multi-model approach yielded 40 scenarios that together encompass the current range of uncertainties of future GHG emissions. None of these scenarios explicitly include additional climate initiatives, such as the Kyoto Protocol. Figure 17 presents the range of CO 2 emissions scenarios included in the report, normalized to an index where 1990 emissions levels equal one. Although the scenarios presented in Figure 17 are global and not U.S.-specific, they nevertheless serve to highlight (a) the wide range of possible emissions scenarios, (b) that stabilization of carbon emissions post-2017 at 1996 levels (i.e., the Working Group's proposed Carbon Cap-and-Trade Scenario for the US) is a scenario that falls within the range presented here (again, on a global scale), (c) but that stabilization at 1996 levels by 2017 does represent an aggressive carbon reduction case. That said, it is not clear how much comparison can or should be made between international and U.S. emissions growth, as the dynamics differ considerably for developed and developing countries. More generally, a great deal of analysis has been conducted to evaluate the potential impacts of carbon reduction generally, and Kyoto compliance in particular. Substantial disagreement remains on the cost of achieving carbon reductions. Technical-economic (bottom-up) models often project that emissions reductions of 10-30% may be achievable at little or no net cost to society, while macroeconomic (top-down) models typically conclude that costs will be significant. This is not always the case, however: some macroeconomic general equilibrium models exhibit a high degree of flexibility, which can result in compliance at low costs. Moreover, models such as NEMS, which represent a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches, can yield compliance costs that vary considerably based on assumptions about consumer behavior.
In a recent summary of some of these studies in Energy Economics, 27 Springer found that estimated compliance costs varied widely both across models (due to different modeling assumptions and approaches) and under varying assumptions for Kyoto compliance rules (e.g., allowance for international trading, sinks, etc.). Assuming liberal global trading for carbon dioxide credits, permit prices under Kyoto range from $1 to $22 per metric ton of CO2 (2000$) depending on the study, with an average of $9 ($3.7-$81/mtce, with an average of $33/mtce). If trade is allowed only among Annex B countries, however, permit prices under the same Kyoto requirements are projected to range from $3-74 per metric ton of CO2 (2000$) depending on the study, with an average of $27 ($11-$271/mtce, with an average of $99/mtce).
Carbon Scenarios in Utility Integrated Resource Planning
The private sector is also beginning to recognize the risk of future carbon regulation. For example, an increasing number of utility integrated resource plans are describing carbon risks, and analyzing those risks. We review treatment of carbon risk in some of these plans, which are in the public domain, below. Other private energy sector firms, such as oil companies, are also beginning to consider carbon risk, though their assumptions and analysis are typically not in the public domain.
$29/mtce), and that these values should be used in assessing the benefits of energy efficiency investments.
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• PG&E's 2004 long-term plan, meanwhile, used the present value of the cost trend developed in the CPUC consultant report ($8/ton-CO2, or $29/mtce) to estimate the risk reduction value of their preferred generation plan.
Conclusions
Based on the summary presented above, we conclude that a wide range of carbon regulation scenarios are possible, especially within the timeframe considered by EERE and FE (through 2050). The FE-EERE Scenarios Working Group's Carbon Cap-&-Trade Scenario is found to be less aggressive than many Kyoto-style targets, somewhat similar in magnitude to the Climate Stewardship Act, and less aggressive that some other scenarios found in the literature.
We also find that the 2010 start-date of the proposed carbon regulation, with full compliance reached in 2017, is conservative relative to other scenarios that have been considered in the literature. 29 It deserves note that most of the studies presented here emphasize the possibility of near-to medium-term response to climate change, but even more aggressive longer-term carbon reductions might be considered. Such reductions (beyond stabilization at year 1996 levels) are not contemplated in the Working Group proposal, and arguably, should be.
Despite this, the Working Group proposal for carbon reductions is aggressive in the near term, and may explore the limits of NEMS in analyzing the cost of carbon reductions (NEMS, like most energy models, is arguably better at predicting the impact of small deviations in conditions than the impact of sizable market changes). Specifically, we are somewhat concerned that the stringency of the proposed carbon regulation scenario, which ignores carbon banking and offsets and does not allow nuclear power to expand, will lead to a particularly high estimated cost of carbon reduction. If this is true, some will certainly argue that NEMS is not an adequate tool to estimate the cost of stringent carbon regulations. Just as important, in the face of such possible costs, it might be argued that carbon regulations of the type contemplated are politically unlikely. We therefore encourage some flexibility in the Working Group's ultimate implementation of the Carbon Cap-and-Trade Scenario. 28 Energy and Environmental Economics and Rocky Mountain Institute. 2004. "A Forecast of Cost Effectiveness, Avoided Costs and Externality Adders." Prepared for the California Public Utilities Commission. 29 On the other hand, given that the earliest that any such regulation or legislation could possibly be enacted would be in 2005, and that prudence would dictate allowing ample time (e.g., possibly several years) to prepare for implementation, 2010 does not seem overly conservative outside of the context of other studies and scenarios examined.
Other Observations
Here we conclude with three additional (yet somewhat tangential) observations:
1. Additional Scenarios to Consider: While we believe that carbon and high fuel price scenarios are entirely appropriate, our review of other scenarios suggests that at least three additional scenarios merit consideration in future rounds of this work: (1) multi-pollutant regulations that involve increasingly stringent requirements for criteria air pollutants, 30 (2) external state or national renewable energy and energy efficiency standards (e.g., national RPS, more aggressive state-level RPS programs, more stringent CAFÉ standards), 31 and (3) inclusion of high coal prices within the High Fuel Price Scenario. The second of these three scenarios, in particular, appears both possible and also highly relevant to EERE's R&D portfolio, though its interaction with possibly heightened national-level appliance efficiency standards requires greater thought (the application of such standards might be considered an appropriate scenario, but appliance standards are also under the direct responsibility of DOE).
Specification of the High Fuel Price Scenario:
We are somewhat concerned about the specification of the Working Group's proposed High Fuel Price Scenario. This scenario envisions a target for natural gas prices rising to $7.5/mmBTU by 2050, while oil prices were initially proposed to be set according to EIA's AEO High World Oil Price case. It should be noted, however, that oil and gas prices (as well as coal prices, as substitutes for both oil and gas can be derived from coal, and coal directly competes with gas in the power sector) are linked in energy models, such as NEMS and MARKAL, due to substitution possibilities between the two energy sources. As such, it may simply be impossible to specify a joint gas/oil scenario in the way envisioned above. This consideration should be addressed by the modeling and scenario-building teams.
Ability of Integrated Energy Models to Respond to the Scenarios:
It deserves note that many analysts have questioned the ability of integrated energy models to adequately respond to extreme scenarios, given that model parameters tend to be set based on historical data that fall within fairly narrow ranges. This debate is particularly acute with carbon regulation, where estimates of the cost carbon reduction range widely, but similar concerns exist in specifying high fuel price scenarios that significantly exceed historical prices. As such, implementing extreme carbon or fuel price scenarios in NEMS or MARKAL (or any other energy model) will require substantial forethought and planning, as well as careful ex-post assessment of the degree to which the model has adequately or appropriately responded to the scenario at hand. 30 Previous studies of the impact of multi-pollutant legislation, however, suggest that retrofitting for pollution control is generally a cheaper option (with the notable exception of carbon) than deploying renewables or energy efficiency, so this scenario may not be particularly interesting to EERE. 31 Since the renewable or efficiency standards would be present in both the program (with R&D) and baseline (without R&D) cases, the degree of renewable or efficiency penetration would most likely be similar in both cases, and the benefits of EERE's R&D program would be reflected through lower compliance costs (rather than different penetration levels).
